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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLANT
NOT IN CUSTODY

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case # 20040962-CA

STEVEN D. HUMPHREY
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLAN T

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Final Judgement and Comtnil

11 111< I 11>lifh District Court,

Duchesne County, for conviction of two Second Degree Felony violations of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8 et. seq. Possession with Intent to Distribute and Cultivation of Marijuana; one Third
Degree Felony violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3) Possession of a Dangerous Weapon;
and a Class B Misdemeanor violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal I V< n i 11 im R ule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code 78-2a3(2).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court error in admitting into trial, evidence that was seized in violation of
State and Federal Fourth Amendment Constitutional provisions.
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Admissibility of evidence is a question of law; thus, the Court of Appeals generally grants
no deference to trial court's decision on that issue, but reviews it for correctness. State
v.Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief
and pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Steven Humphrey was charged in an amended Information on November 8, 1999 , in
the Eighth District Court, Duchesne County, of two Second Degree Felony violations of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 et. seq. Possession with Intent to Distribute and Cultivation of Marijuana;
one Third Degree Felony violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3) Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon; one Class B Misdemeanor violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia (R11).
On December 4, 1999, a Preliminary Hearing was held in which the State called as
witnesses Cecil Gurr, Derek Nelson and Ammon Manning. After the Court heard the testimony
of the state witnesses the Court bound Mr. Humphrey over for trial on the charges (R.25).
On January 3, 2000, the trial court heard a Motion to Suppress and verbally denied Mr.
Humphrey's Motion (Transcript of Suppression Motion, R. 168).
On April 4, 2000, a jury trial was held in Duchesne and Mr. Humphrey was convicted of
the four counts described above (R.91). Forfeiture counts were also included in the information
and in the jury trial but are not the subject of this appeal.
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Mr. Humphrey was sentenced and it was deemed filed on January 23, 2001, to one to
fifteen years on each of the two second degree felony convictions, zero to five years on the third
degree felony and six months in jail on the class B misdemeanor. All four sentences were court
ordered to run consecutive. His prison sentence was stayed and Mr. Humphrey was ordered to
serve one year in the Duchesne County Jail (R123). On April 9, 2001, on Law & Motion
calendar the Court addressed Mr. Humphrey's concern that he have counsel appointed to assist
him (R171, pg 34). On April 23, 2001, public defender Karen Allen assured the trial court that
she was counsel on the case and would file an appeal on behalf of Mr. Humphrey (R.171, pg.
35). On May 22, 2001, Attorney Karen Allen filed aNotice of Appeal (R.157). On November
12, 2001, pursuant to the request of the County and Karen Allen, Julie George entered an
Appearance of Counsel for purposes of pursuing the appeal.
Julie George pursued the appeal then assigned case no. 20010503-CA. This Court
dismissed the appeal, over the objection of both the defense, appellate counsel and the Utah
Attorney General's Office on the basis that this Court believed the Notice of Appeal was
untimely filed. The Memorandum Decision filed on May 16, 2000 stated that the Notice of
Appeal was untimely and the verbal extension to file the Notice given to trial counsel in
chambers was invalid (R.271).
After dismissal the trial court and counsel determined that Mr. Humphrey's rights would
be best served by revoking the earlier sentence, imposing a new sentence and thereby re-starting
the time to appeal (R. 274).
On August 23, 2004 the trial court granted the post conviction relief of Mr. Humphrey
(R.278) and imposed his new sentence on October 19, 2004 (R.278, 281, 284-289).
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On November 8, 2004 Mr. Humphrey filed a new Notice of Appeal (R.292) and again the
case was assigned to Julie George to pursue the issue of the alleged illegal search and seizure to
this Court for review. Two separate case numbers were assigned to case on appeal, 20040962
and 20041119. On January 18, 2005 the cases were consolidated under case no. 20040962-CA
(R.328).
On February 28, 2005 this Court again attempted to dismiss the case before reaching the
merits on the basis that the trial court was unclear as to why Mr. Humphrey was re-sentenced.
Both the Utah Attorney General's Office and the defense again opposed the Summary
Disposition and recited the civil case in which Mr. Humphrey sought post-conviction habeas
relief specifically for purposes of having his appeal addressed. This Court then dismissed the sua
sponte Motion to Dismiss and set the briefing schedule.
Appeal counsel sought a thirty day initial extension for filing the brief and the Court
granted the stipulated motion. The opening brief is due on July 18, 2005. During the time of the
initial filing to present Mr. Humphrey was released from custody.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts relevant to the issues presented on appeal deal only with the search and seizure
of evidence and the trial court's denial of Mr. Humphrey's Motion to Suppress Evidence. No
aspects of the trial are challenged in this appeal.
Cecil Gurr, the Police Chief of Roosevelt City and a member of the Uintah Basin
Narcotics Strike Force, along with approximately five other officers of the Strike Force went to
the residence of Steven Humphrey at midnight on September 5,1999 (Preliminary Hearing
Transcript. 2-6, 8).
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The Police Chief and the Narcotics Strike Force had received information from a
confidential informant that Mr Humphrey had marijuana plants in his home, however the police
decided not to get a warrant because the information from the informant and a fly-over
(presumably an aerial view of the property) was stale and apparently insufficient for a warrant
(Motion to Suppress Transcript, 14, 25).
Mr. Humphrey lived about twelve miles outside of town in Duchesne County in a motor
home that was inoperable and converted into a trailer home (PHT, 7, MST, 18). As it was the
middle of the night it was dark outside and no lights were on inside the motor home. A teenager
and some very young children were asleep in beds on a wooden porch area attached to the
converted motor home (PHT, 8).
Even though it was midnight and the children were asleep outside the door, Police Chief
Gurr beat on the door until Mr. Humphrey woke up and opened the door (Motion to Suppress
Transcript, 9). The police Chief identified himself and fellow officers and asked to come into
the home (PHT,. 2-10). There is a dispute in testimony as to whether Mr. Humphrey allowed the
offers in to the motor home or if the officers pushed their way inside the door. The trial court
held that when the officers asked if they could come in Mr. Humphrey said "uh-huh" and the
officers stepped inside the door. After the officers got into the home three or four feet, they
asked Mr. Humphrey to turn over marijuana plants that they knew he had in his possession. Mr.
Humphrey, who had just woke up and was in his night clothes stated he had no plants and asked
the officers to leave. The officers did not leave and the Police Chief asked Mr. Humphrey again
about the plants. Mr. Humphrey asked if the police had a warrant and the Police Chief told Mr.
Humphrey that he did not have a warrant (PHT, 7). As the police were asking Mr. Humphrey
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again about the marijuana plant, another officer inside the trailer, Detective Manning, began
shining a flashlight around in the dark room and saw a marijuana plant and told Mr. Humphrey
he was under arrest. Mr. Humphrey bolted for the door and the police apprehended him and
placed him in hand cuffs (PHT, 7-11). Deputy Manning did not have the light on the whole time
he was in the motor home, but had it on 3/4 of the time he was inside the room (MST, 26).
After Mr. Humphrey had bolted for the door and was arrested and placed in handcuffs the
police state that they searched his bed in a search incident to arrest (PHT, 12) and found a
handgun. The Police Chief stated that Mr. Humphrey was a foot or two from the door of the
motor home and would have had to lunge ten feet or so back into the motor home to the bed to
get the gun that was in the middle of the bed (MST, 16-17). The gun was found after Mr.
Humphrey was arrested and in handcuffs. Although the police stated they went back into search
the bed incident to arrest, they testified that they had gone back into the one room motor home to
look for other people and do a protective sweep of the room when they found the gun (MST, 2123). The motor home was modified so that there were no walls or partitions, just one room with
a wood burning stove (MST 22-23).
Tiffany Allen, Mr. Humphrey's granddaughter was one of the people out on the wood
porch when the police arrived. Ms. Allen testified that after the police arrested her grandfather
they asked her if there were any weapons around and she told them about the handgun inside the
motor home at which time the police went back into the motor home and retrieved the gun (MST,
38). Ms. Allen's boyfriend, Pete Hoffman was with Tiffany Allen that night on the bed that was
on the deck outside the motor home (MST, 42). He testified that the police asked Tiffany if there
were weapons in the motor home and then the police went back into the motor home to retrieve
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thegun(MST,43).
Mr. Humphrey, Ms. Allen and Mr. Hoffman all testified that the police came to the door
and began calling out to Mr. Humphrey (MST, 42-45, 36-39, 27-31), when Mr. Humphrey asked
them if they had a warrant they told him they did not need one and to open the door. When Mr.
Humphrey opened the door the police pushed their way inside and did not leave until Mr.
Humphry asked them to do so numerous times. This testimony differs from the Police Chief and
from Detective Manning who state that they asked if they could come in, Mr. Humphrey let them
in and that they did not leave the first time Mr. Humphrey asked them to do so, but that they left
on his second request when he asked if they had a warrant.
After Mr. Humphrey was arrested and taken to jail the police obtained a warrant to search
the motor home and apparently the surrounding curtiliage (PT 15). The search yielded sixty-one
mature marijuana plants outside the motor home and many juvenile plants in the motor home (PT
15). The police found water tanks they believed were used to water the plants and zig-zag rolling
papers and PH testing material and scales.
At the suppression hearing the trial court held that the initial entry of the motor home
was legal, that the police presence remaining in the home was legal, that Detective Manning's
use of the flashlight was not illegal use for the search but necessary to view where they weredespite it not being on the whole time- and that the plant was in plain view when the light was
cast upon it (MST 60). Additionally, the court held that as the plant was in plain view, the arrest
of Mr. Humphrey was legal and the search for the gun was a legal search incident to arrest (MST
61).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Humphrey asserts that the police "knock & talk" entry into his home in the middle of
the night on September 5, 1999 and the subsequent interrogation, "plain view" discovery of
contraband, search of his bed, home and area around his home were all in violation of Fourth
Amendment protections pursuant to both the state and federal constitutions.
Mr. Humphrey alleges that to come to his home in the middle of the night, surround his
home with Naircotics Task Force Officers, bang on his door, barge into his home and demand that
he confess to where illegal contraband was hidden was a violation of his State and Federal Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable, warrant less search and seizure. The police
admit they did not have the evidence necessary to obtain a warrant so they went in the middle of
the night without a warrant and coerced their way into the home of Mr. Humphrey. Such action
violates the Fourth Amendment and Mr. Humphrey's right to due process of law.
Any evidence found in the home in "plain view" was evidence found when the officer
illegally searched the home by shining his flashlight around to search after he was repeatedly
asked to leave the home. This evidence was only in plain view due to the officer's illegal entry
into the home, unlawful presence in the home after told to leave, and illegal search of the room
with his flashlight. Any "plain view" evidence should be suppressed.
The weapon found on the bed as evidence seized "incident to arrest" should be
inadmissible as evidence based on the initial illegal entry in the home, the illegal presence in the
home and should not be allowed in as evidence incident to arrest. Mr. Humphrey had already
headed to the door, was arrested and in hand-cuffs outside when the officers returned inside the
home to search for the gun. A search incident to arrest does not include going back into the
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home to search a bed when the defendant is in handcuffs outside the home in a police car. At no
time while in the motor home did the police ask if anyone else was inside, state they believed
anyone else was inside or articulate fear that another person was hiding in the tiny one room
motor home.
Finally, any evidence seized pursuant to the warrant obtained hours later is evidence that
should be suppressed as the warrant itself was based on the initial illegal entry in to the home and
illegal presence in the home after being asked to leave. The warrant was based on fruits of the
poisonous tree and was not reliable evidence.
All evidence in this case was found based on the first initial illegal entry into the home
and therefore all evidence seized before and after the warrant should be suppressed. However,
even if the Court finds the initial entry was legal, the search with the flashlight was illegal and
the re-entry into the home to seize the weapon was illegal.
ARGUMENT
AS THE INITIAL ENTRY INTO THE HOME WAS ILLEGAL, ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED
AFTER ENTRY SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED AS FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE AND
ON INDIVIDUAL SEPARATE GROUNDS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS.
The trial court erred in its ruling by not suppressing evidence presented in trial that was
clearly obtained incident to a search that was illegal. The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Utah declare: "The right of people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated...."
The Police Chief and Detective Manning admitted that they could not get a warrant to
search Mr. Humphrey's property. So rather than engage in more investigation, they went to his
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home in the middle of the night with the "Strike Force" team and banged on his door until he
opened it up. Mr. Humphrey knew his teen-age granddaughter and other little grand kids were
outside the motor home only a few feet away from the armed police officers. It was dark, Mr.
Humphrey v/as still groggy from sleep and the police wanted into the motor home. Mr.
Humphrey is adamant that he did not allow them in, but that they barged in through the open
door. They never told him he had the right to refuse their entry , the right to leave, the right to a
lawyer or anything other than to interrogate him about marijuana plants. Mr. Humphrey was one
adult with armed police inside his tiny one room motor home, in the middle of the night, with his
grand children outside. Such a situation was custodial in nature and Mr. Humphrey was not free
to leave nor free to refuse the officers entry into his home. Even if this Court believes that Mr.
Humphrey allowed the police into his home, the surrounding circumstances show that it was not
voluntary consent based on the officers actions, the armed presence of the task force, the late
hour, the presence of the small children, and Mr. Humphrey's sleepy mental state.
In State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) the Court stated, "...law
enforcement officers may neither search nor seize unless and until they have a warrant supported
by probable cause. Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are "unreasonable per se
unless [they] fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment." (Citations omitted). Departures from the warrant requirement must be limited to "a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). For example, specific exceptions to the
warrant requirement include searches incident to arrest, searches of movable vehicles, and
seizure of clearly incriminating evidence or contraband in plain view. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
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264, 267 (Utah 1985). The Fourth Amendment, however, does not permit such warrant less
activities unless the police have probable cause for the arrest or search."
In this case the police stated they did not think they had evidence that would support a
warrant. Therefore the police admitted they could not legally search the home. Instead they
opted for a "knock & talk" where they went to the home to ask for permission to enter and search
the grounds. However, the police went to the home in the middle of the night, banged on the
door until Mr. Humphrey woke up and surrounded the home with armed "Strike Force" officers.
Additionally, little children were outside. Although Mr. Humphrey states that he did not give the
officers permission to enter and a tape of the incident does not indicate he did give him
permission, any permission to enter was clearly coerced. In the face of police presence, in the
middle of the night and the officer's repeated statements that they did not need a warrant, no
consent to come inside could have been voluntary.
The next issue if whether after repeated requests to leave the home if Detective
Manning's actions of shining the flashlight around the room was a search. Manning testified he
did not have the light on the entire time he was in the motor home so the light was obviously not
necessary to see. Additionally, Manning and Gurr were only a couple of feet inside the door.
They did not need the light to see to get out of the motor home. Manning was clearly using the
light to shine around the room and search for contraband. Such action was a search-the plant
would not have been in plain view if not for Manning's actions of searching the room with the
flashlight.
The officers were repeatedly asked to leave the home and they failed to do so. Unless the
officers had probable cause, they had no basis to be in the home, remain in the home or search
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the room with the flashlight.
The only basis for entry into a home without a warrant would be exigent circumstances,
i.e., the risk of destruction of evidence, safety of a person, risk of flight etc. In this case the
motor home was clearly inoperable and the officers knew that fact. It was the middle of the
night, no person's safety was at stake, there was no indication of the destruction of evidence and
no risk of flight.
In CitvofOremv. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1994), the Court stated,
"Under the Fourth Amendment, we employ a strong preference in favor of warrants, particularly
when a person's residence is involved. Indeed," 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the . . . Fourth Amendment is directed.' ...As such, "searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." (Citations omitted).
As entry into the home was illegal and the act of remaining in the home after Mr.
Humphrey ordered the police to leave was illegal, the shining of the flashlight around the room to
search for contraband was clearly illegal. Had it not been for Manning's search using the
flashlight the plant would never have been discovered. The flashlight was not. needed to find
their way out of the room and was used to search. Such a search was illegal and the "plain view"
exception does not apply in this case.
The police stated that after Mr. Humphrey left the room and was hand cuffed outside they
had to return to the room and search pursuant to the arrest. Such action is contrary to the search
incident to arrest doctrine which provides that the underlying arrest must be lawful. Here, the
underlying arrest was not lawful, it was based on an illegal warrant less entry, illegal plain view
seizure and unlawful presence in the motor home after being asked to leave.
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In State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000),. "[W]hen a policeman has made
a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." New York v.
Belton. 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981). Additionally, "the police may also
examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment...." Id.
Although Mr. Humphrey was in a motor home it was clearly not operable and the police
knew that it was not. It had the entire cab converted into the one room living quarters and a
wood porch built up around it.
If a person is arrested in his home the police do not have a right to search the entire home
incident to arrest. Knowing this, the police tried to argue that they returned to search for other
people or clear the area. However, it was one small room and the police never indicated they
feared other people were in there until after Ms. Allen told of the gun inside the motor home.
Mr. Humphrey was outside the motor home and in hand cuffs, there was no danger that he could
re-enter the motor home and obtain the weapon.
In fact Section 77-7-9 of the Utah Code provides that M[a]ny person making an arrest may
seize from the person arrested all weapons which he may have on or about his person." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-9 (1995). There is no evidence in the record that the gun was on Mr.
Humphrey when he was arrested or that he was even attempting to get to it-in fact he was bolting
the opposite direction-towards the door.
Finally, all evidence seized from the search warrant should be suppressed as all of that
evidence was seized from a warrant that was based on illegally obtained evidence. All factual
basis to support the warrant were facts gained from the initial illegal entry into the home.
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Pursuant to the doctrine established long ago in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), all evidence flowing from the first illegal
activity is considered "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should be suppressed. There can be no
good faith exception under the warrant as the very officers who applied for the warrant were the
officers who made the initial illegal entry.
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue
of illegal detention and subsequent searches in the context of vehicle stops. Mr. Humphrey
asserts that his home should be afforded equal if not greater protection than that of a motor
vehicle. In Hansen, the Court found that there is a multi tiered analysis. First, was the encounter
consensual or not. If it was initially consensual it can de-escalate to non-consensual. If it deescalates to non-consensual and the person is detained illegally the test turns to the evidence
found and if that evidence is tainted by the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
The Court held that the only effectively available way to deter the police from violating the
constitution is to remove the incentive to disregard it-which is to suppress the evidence in the
criminal case.
Here, Mr. Humphrey asserts that to engage in a "knock & talk" in the middle of the night
is evidence of police coercion. Further, to assert that without a warrant they could still push their
way into the home is a violation of his constitutional rights-both state and federal. Finally, to
search his home for a gun after his arrest and with a required re-entry into his home after the
arrest was illegal. Further any evidence obtained from the search of the home or surrounding
property was illegal as it stemmed from the illegal entry. All evidence obtained from the police
encounter should be suppressed as a violation of his constitutional rights.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Humphrey respectfully requests that this Court enter a ruling that the evidence of the
marijuana, paraphernalia and weapon was seized illegally and should not have been admissible
in the trial court vacate his conviction and remand his case to the trial court for further action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/_£_ day.
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Attorney for Steven Humphrey, Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered or mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
LAURA DUPAIX, SECTION CHIEF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854
DATED THIS

/ Y>
It

DAY OFxr/jMJl

2005

15

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

H_*. u

KAREN ALLEN #7454
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY
STEPHEN D. FOOTE #8945
DEPUTY DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
(435)738-0184
(435) 738-0186 (fax)

«/v-

•-1

r '

DUCHESTTE C'OUNTYTUTAH

. n ^%
*3 '
jop3S££KEE, CLERK
w ^ T " DEPUTY
ULT

uy

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Criminal No. 991800095
STEVEN D. HUMPHREY,
Defendant.

Judge A. Lynn Payne
oooOooo—

PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA) - A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY
POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN BY A RESTRICTED PERSON - A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
(MARIJUANA) - A SECOND DEGREE FELONY
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR
The above-entitled case came before the Court for re-sentencing on Monday, September
20,2004, the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne, presiding. The defendant was present. The State
of Utah was represented by Stephen D. Foote, Deputy Duchesne County Attorney. Based upon
the motion by the defendant and the stipulation of the State, the Court orders that the defendant
be re-sentenced, and said sentence shall be ordered nunc pro tunc to December 18, 2000.

That the defendant has been convicted upon his own pleas of guilty of the offenses of
Production of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), a Second Degree Felony, in violation of
Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) UCA (1953) as amended; Possession of a Handgun by a Restricted
Person, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(iii) UCA (1953) as
amended; Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute (Marijuana), a
Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) UCA (1953) as amended;
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section58-37a-5
UCA (1953) as amended.
That for the offense of Production of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), a Second
Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate
term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison and to pay
a fine in the sum of SI,000. That for the offense of Possession of a Handgun by a Restricted
Person, a Third Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine in the
sum of $1,000. That for the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to
Distribute (Marijuana), a Second Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is
sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years
in the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine in the sum of $1,000. That for the offense of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered that the
defendant is sentenced to serve a term of six (6) months in the Duchesne County Jail and to pay a
fine in the sum of $300. Said prison and jail sentences shall run concurrent with each other.
The foregoing prison and jail sentences are suspended and the defendant is placed on
supervised probation for a period of three (3) years on the following terms and conditions:

1. The defendant shall enter into the regular agreement with Adult Probation and Parole
and strictly abide by the conditions of the agreement.
2. The defendant shall violate no laws.
3. The defendant shall successfully complete any counseling recommended by Adult
Probation and Parole.
4. The defendant shall not possess or consume alcohol or be where alcohol is being
possessed or consumed.
5. The defendant shall maintain full-time employment.
6. The defendant submit to drug testing, at his own expense, once per week and provide
proof to Adult Probation and Parole.
7. The defendant shall serve one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail.
8. The defendant shall carry with him at all times the identification card provided to him
by Adult Probation and Parole, and he shall show the identification card to any law enforcement
officer he comes in contact with.
9. The defendant shall keep this Court and his probation officer informed of his current
address and report to the Court whenever he is requested to do so.
10. Defendant shall obey all the rules of the Duchesne County Jail during his period of
incarceration.
11. The defendant shall pay the fines in this matter on terms set forth by Adult Probation
and Parole.

12. The defendant shall not blame the police officers for his problems resulting from this
matter.
DATED this

/Q

day of September, 2004.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

A. L Y N N M
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

WJ&M^-A
- J£^H(JU4
Marea A. Doherty
Attorney for Defendant

STATE OF UTAH
1
County of Duchesne J
I, Joanne McKee, Clerk of the District Court, do
hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a
full, true and correct copy of the original document
which is on file in my office.
In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and seal
of that said Court above mentioned, this 3^L

day of
By-

Uu-

JOANNE McKEE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
PLAINTIFF,
CASE NO. 991800095

vs.

STEVEN D.HUMPHREY
DEFENDANT.

:

JUDGE.

A. LYNN PAYNE

COMES NOW the Defendant, STEVEN D. HUMPHREY, and serves notice of his intent
to appeal the decision of the above-entitled Court which was settled in its entirety on October 19,
2004 upon entry of the Judgment and Order entered in the Eighth District Court, Duchesne
County, Utah. Said Judgment and Order resulted from the Defendant's re-sentencing hearing on
September 20, 2004. This re-sentencing hearing concluded the matter wherein the defendant
was re-sentenced, and said sentence was ordered nunc pro tunc to December 18, 2000. The
defendant has been found guilty to the charge of Production of a Controlled Substance
(Marijuana), a Second Degree Felony; to the charge of Possession of a Handgun by a Restricted
Person, a Third Degree Felony; to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance
(Marijuana), a Second Degree Felony; to the charge of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, A
Class B Misdemeanor. The Defendant further specifies that he appeals from the decision of the
Court on the basis that the Court improperly admitted matters into evidence which were without

foundation, were not the be^t evidence and were immaterial to the issues and further that the
Court did not correctly apply the law to the facts presented at trial.
DATED this 6

day of November, 2004.

MAREA A. DOHERTY
Attorney for Defendant

f
/

STATE O F UTAH
)
County of Duchesne J
I, Joanne McKee, Clerk of the District Court, do
hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a
full, true and correct copy of the original document
which is on file in my office.
In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and seal
of that said Court above mentioned, thisJft*1^
day of
UuV
A.D. o2^y
JOANNE McKEE

By
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